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Can They Make a Difference in Europe? 
 








Rainy Day Funds (RDFs) have an important role in the USA. They allow States – which usually 
have rules requiring a balanced budget for current revenue and spending – to limit procyclical 
fiscal policies. This paper examines the possible role of RDFs in the European fiscal framework. 
The analysis suggests that RDFs would not fundamentally alter the incentive problems at the root 
of the difficulties in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, RDFs are 
not an option for countries  with high deficits. However, for low-deficit  countries, RDFs can 
lessen the rigidity of the 3 per cent threshold in bad times. RDFs could be introduced on a 
voluntary  basis  at  the  national  level  and  could  contribute  to  make  the  rules  more  country-
specific. The introduction of RDFs would require a change in the definition of the “Maastricht 
deficit”:  deposits  and  withdrawals  should  be  considered  respectively  as  budget  expense  and 
revenue. In this way, the balances held in RDFs could be spent in bad times without an increase 
in the deficit. To ensure that RDFs are not used opportunistically, deposits should only be made 
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1. Introduction 
 
The long debate on European Union (EU) fiscal rules has highlighted their weak points, 
including the lack of strong incentives for fiscal discipline in good times and the related 
possibility that in bad times countries have to choose between implementing procyclical 
policies  and  trespassing  the  3-percent-of-GDP  deficit  threshold.  The  experience  of  US 




Almost all States in the USA have legal provisions mandating that the budget should be 
balanced on a yearly basis. Although different from European fiscal rules, this balanced-
budget requirement has similar implications. In good times it will be relatively easy to 
comply with the rule as revenue will be abundant. However, keeping a balanced budget 
through a downturn will entail procyclical tax increases and/or expenditure cuts, unless 
significant surpluses are run in the upturn. To deal with this problem, starting mainly from 
the late seventies, US States have been adopting RDFs.
2 The idea is rather intuitive and 
appealing: money is saved and accumulated into the fund in good times, whereas money is 
withdrawn and spent in bad times. This can allow the State to stick to the balanced-balance 
requirement while avoiding increasing taxes and/or decreasing expenditures in bad times.  
 
This paper addresses the following questions: can RDFs tackle the incentive problem at the 
hearth of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) difficulties? Can RDFs make the European 
framework more flexible? What changes would be required in the EU framework to make 
RDFs an effective instrument? 
 
The analysis suggests that RDFs would not fundamentally alter the incentive problems of 
the SGP. Moreover, RDFs are not an option for countries with high deficits (even in good 
times, there would be no surplus to be saved). However, for low-deficit countries, RDFs 
can alleviate the rigidity of the 3 per cent threshold in bad times. RDFs could be introduced 
on a voluntary  basis at the national  level and could contribute to make the rules  more 
country-specific. The introduction of RDFs would require a change in the definition of the 
“Maastricht deficit”: deposits and withdrawals should be considered respectively as budget 
expense and revenue. In this way, the balances held in RDFs could be spent in bad times 
without an  increase  in the deficit. To ensure that RDFs are  not used opportunistically, 
deposits  should  only  be  made  out  of  budget  surpluses  and  circumstances  allowing 
withdrawals should be specified ex ante. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the US and the European set-ups 
highlighting similarities and differences. Section 3 reviews the available evidence on US 
                                                 
1  Buti et al. (2003) suggested the introduction of RDFs in the EU. They noted that, while the possibility to 
establish RDFs would not tackle at the root the incentive problem that governments have in good times, the 
flexibility  that  they  would  provide  would  allow  a  tightening  of  sanctioning  procedures  for  countries 
exceeding the 3 per cent limit. Sapir et al. (2003) noted that a voluntary system of RDFs could improve the 
incentives to secure surpluses in good times while increasing the room for manoeuvre in bad times. They 
concluded  that the  advantages  of  this  step  should  be  assessed  against the  cost  of  revision  of  national 
accounting rules.   
2  In the US the main rationale for introducing RDFs lies more with the need to avoid discontinuities in tax 
and spending programs, than with the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy. The cyclicality of 
fiscal  policy  at  the  State  level  is  not  really  a  big  issue  in the  US.  Indeed,  the  fiscal  impulse  will  be 
determined by the federal government which is not bound by any fiscal rule and can undo the State’s fiscal 
stance.   3 
States fiscal performance to see whether and under what conditions RDFs significantly 
improve fiscal performance. Section 4 discusses the possibility to introduce RDFs in the 
European  framework  and  what  can  be  expected  from  such  an  innovation.  Section  5 
concludes and indicates issues for future research. 
 
 
2. Fiscal rules in the USA and the EU: similarities and differences 
 
The European fiscal framework was developed gradually. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) set 
the fiscal criteria to be met by EU member states in order to join the European monetary 
union (EMU). According to the Treaty, member states have to avoid “excessive deficits”, 
defined as situations where: (a) government deficit exceeds 3 per cent of GDP (unless the 
extra deficit is exceptional, temporary and small), or (b) government debt is higher than 60 
per  cent of  GDP  and  is  not  declining  at  a  satisfactory  pace.  These  same  criteria  were 
intended to regulate the fiscal behaviour of member states after they joined EMU.
3 
 
The SGP - 1997 and 2005 - complemented the Treaty with a view to reconcile permanent 
restraint on deficit and debt levels with margins for fiscal stabilization. More specifically, 
the  Pact  introduced  the  new  objective  of  a  medium-term  budgetary  position  close-to-
balance-or-in-surplus (CTB), where medium-term can be interpreted as the length of the 
economic cycle and the CTB objective as a target in cyclically adjusted terms (net of the 
effect of temporary measures).  
 
The CTB medium-term target is intended to provide margins for stabilization policy during 
“normal” cyclical fluctuations (changes in the output gap) without breaching the 3 per cent 
deficit threshold (fig. 1). Additional room for manoeuvre in the face of other unfavourable 
events is provided by specific provisions governing the possibility to trespass the 3 per cent 




In the USA, almost all States have a balanced-budget requirement.
5 Though some deficit 
financing is allowed, this is subject to strict limits. Therefore many States also have an 
RDF as a means to avoid tax increases and/or spending cuts in bad times while complying 
with the balanced-budget requirement. RDFs are seen as a means to avoid abrupt changes 
in tax and spending policy rather than as a means to allow active fiscal stabilization.
6 The 
                                                 
3  The development of and rationale for these rules are discussed, e.g., in Buti and Sapir, 1998; Brunila et al., 
2001; Buti and Franco, 2005.
 
4  The recent revision of the SGP increased its flexibility but did not affect the trust of the fiscal framework. 
With the revision, CTB medium-term targets vary across countries depending on debt level and potential 
growth and the set of circumstances allowing the nominal deficit to exceed 3 per cent of GDP has been 
enriched.  
5  Even  if  most  US  States  share  many  features  concerning  fiscal  policy,  there  is  a  high  degree  of 
heterogeneity in the way the fiscal framework is actually implemented. In particular, the specifications of 
the balanced-budget requirement vary significantly across States. Some have a simple ex ante provision 
(i.e. a budget proposal cannot be approved unless it foresees a balance between revenue and expense). 
Others have an ex post requirement, whereby any revenue shortfall or spending overrun with respect to the 
approved budget cannot be fully financed through borrowing and must be compensated by tax increases 
and/or spending cuts. See Laubach (2005). In this paper, when we refer to the US States in general, we 
actually refer to the most common fiscal features. 
6  See Knight and Levinson (1999) and McGranahan (1999).
   4 
idea is simple: money is set aside into the fund in good times and it is withdrawn in bad 
times.  
 
The typical state budget is made up of a general fund, which is financed through taxes and 
fees and pays out current expenditure, a capital fund, which is financed through debt and 
motor fuel taxes and pays out infrastructure investments and an RDF. The balanced-budget 
requirement usually refers to the general fund and the corresponding balance is measured 
including transfers to/from the RDF. 
 
This set-up resembles the European one: net of operations with the RDF, the general fund 
will run surpluses in good times and deficit in bad times, resulting close to balance (recall 
that some deficit financing is allowed) on average across good and bad times (fig. 2). 
 
However,  there  are  three  important  differences.  First,  contrary  to  what  happens  under 
European  provisions,  the  US  balanced-budget  requirement  does  not  apply  to  capital 
spending, so that it ultimately implements a “golden rule over the cycle”,
7 closer to the 
fiscal rules adopted in the UK.
8 Second, the maximum deficit allowed in bad times is not 
fixed ex ante (as with the 3 per cent ceiling in the Maastricht Treaty), but depends on the 
resources accumulated in good times. Third, the surpluses obtained in good times must be 
saved  in  the  RDF  and  cannot  be  used  otherwise,  while  in  the  European  framework 





















     
Fig. 2 - Balanced-Budget Requirement and Rainy Day Funds in the USA
budget balance - current account
general fund balance net of RDF operations

















It should also be noted that the definition of good and bad times is not the same in the two 
set-ups. In the US context, the definition of the type of shocks (bad times) against which 
RDFs are meant to provide shelter is not unequivocal. In particular, a broad and a strict 
definition can be distinguished (Hou, 2005). According to the former, bad times are those 
                                                 
7  Specific provisions regulate deficit financing of the capital fund in US States. 
8  The Code for Fiscal Stability (HM Treasury, 1998) defines a fiscal framework based on two rules: (a) the 
“golden  rule”  mandating  that  the  public  sector  current  balance  be  non-negative  on  average  over  the 
economic cycle; and (b) the “sustainable investment rule” requiring that the ratio of net public sector debt 
to GDP be kept at a stable and prudent level (currently set at 40 per cent).  
9 Indeed, because of the limit applying to gross debt, in the European framework there is an incentive for 
high-debt countries not to accumulate financial assets.   5 
when a gap between revenue and expenditure opens either because of the adverse cyclical 
conditions or because of any unexpected adverse shock. The stricter definition limits bad 
times  to  the  presence  of  adverse  cyclical  conditions.  The  SGP  provision  identifies  as 
exceptional  both  unusual  events  outside  the  control  of  the  Member  State  and  severe 
economic downturns. 
 
In the European framework the budget deficit/surplus is defined according to the rules set 
out in the national accounts (ESA95):
10 net lending/borrowing (NL) is the balance of non- 
financial  transactions  (NL=R-G,  with  R  indicating  revenue  and  G  expenditure)  on  an 
accrual basis, whose counterpart – on the financing side – is the change in the government 
net financial asset position (DNA=DA-DL, with DA indicating the change in financial assets 
and  DL  the  change  in  financial  liabilities).  According  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  net 
borrowing should never exceed 3 per cent of GDP: 
 
(1)  NL = R – G = DA – DL = DNA   ³   -3% 
 
In  this  framework,  deposits  to/withdrawals  from  an  RDF  (DRDF)  would  be  included 
among changes in financial assets (DA=DRDF+DOA; where OA stays for “other financial 
assets”). Changes in the balance of the RDF, like any other change in financial assets do 
not affect the deficit level, but the composition of its financing. If there is a deficit (R<G) 
and the government reduces its holding of financial assets (including the balance of the 
RDF)  to  finance  such  deficit  (DA<0),  then  the  need  to  issue  further  debt  (DL)  will 
correspondingly be reduced, but the difference between R and G will not be altered. 
 
 













Fig. 3 - Budgetary margins in bad times:




                                                 
10 See Eurostat (1995) and (2000).
   6 
The US balanced-budget requirement applies to a different balance, which we may denote 
as BUS  and characterize as:
11 
  
(2)  BUS = R – G – DRDF = DOA – DL = 0 
  
Comparing (1) – from which R-G=NL – and (2) – from which R-G-DRDF=0 – we see that 
DRDF=NL. This highlights the similarity between the US framework and the European 
one, but also points to one of the important differences we mentioned before: while in the 
latter there is an ex ante limit to net borrowing (the 3 per cent of GDP threshold), in the 
former net borrowing is only constrained by the extent of savings set aside in the RDF (fig. 
3). 
 
The requirement that BUS be always balanced implies that RDFs cannot be financed by 
issuing  bonds.  This  is  important  to  avoid  a  ratchet  effect  in  gross  (and  net)  financial 
liabilities.  
 
Figure 4 compares the dynamics of budget balances (both NL and BUS), RDF balances and 
financial liabilities (gross and net) under two different regimes: one in which deposits into 
the RDF can only be made out of surpluses and another in which additional deposits can be 
financed by issuing bonds.  
 
Under the  first regime (see the solid  lines  in  Figure 4), net lending and  net borrowing 
balance out over the business cycle (top panel) and BUS is always balanced (second panel). 
The  balance  held  in the  RDF grows during good times and  is spent  in the subsequent 
downturns (third panel). Gross debt is constant at its initial level (fourth panel) and net debt 
falls  during  upturns  (as  assets  are  accumulated)  to  return  to  its  initial  level  during 
downturns (fifth panel). 
 
Now suppose that additional deposits into the RDF, bond-financed, are allowed (see the 
dotted lines in Figure 4), so that the balance held in the RDF at the end of the upturn 
exceeds cumulated surpluses (third panel). Compared to the other regime, this will have no 
bearing on net lending as R-G is unchanged (top panel), but BUS will record a deficit as 
deposits into the RDF exceed R-G (second panel). At the same time, gross debt will rise as 
new bonds are issued (fourth panel), while the path of net debt will be unaffected as new 
bonds are offset by deposits into the RDF (fifth panel). With the onset of the downturn, if 
net borrowing is allowed to rise up to the level of the RDF, it will exceed net lending 
obtained in the upturn (top panel), even though BUS is balanced as R-G=DRDF (second 
panel). Since no new bonds are issued, gross debt will remain at the level reached at the 
end of the upturn (fourth panel), but net debt will rise above its original level (fifth panel) 
as the bonds issued in the upturn are no longer offset by the balance held in the RDF (third 
panel).  As  this  pattern  repeats  over  time,  both  gross  and  net  financial  liabilities  keep 
growing. 
 
                                                 
11 This is a simplification for the sake of comparability. The US  balanced-budget requirement leaves the 
overall deficit (and its financing) undetermined. It is more precisely defined as: 
BUS = Rc – Gc – DRDF = 0 
Where Rc and Gc indicate current revenue and expenditure, respectively.
   7 













Paths under surplus-financed RDF
Paths under bond-financed RDF  
 
 
3.  RDFs and the cyclicality of fiscal policy  
 
In the US framework, before the introduction of RDFs, nothing prevented governments 
from accumulating resources in the general fund. Indeed, almost all States allow surpluses 
to be carried over from one year to the next (McGranahan, 1999).
12 Yet they were not 
doing so and the introduction of RDFs was justified as a means to achieve a higher degree 
of fiscal responsibility in good times.  
 
But how? Indeed, if the structure of the RDF is similar to that of the general fund – i.e. the 
funds are deposited and withdrawn at the legislature’s discretion – an RDF would not have 
                                                 
12 Nearly  all  balanced-budget  rules  are  written  in  stock  terms  rather than in  flow  terms  (Wagner,  2003; 
Wagner and Sobel, 2006).   8 
any actual effect on the ability of the State to cope with bad times: it would simply play 
part of the general fund role.  
 
The criteria according to which funds are deposited into and withdrawn from RDFs vary 
significantly across States and in some cases they are fully discretionary (Appendix 1).
13 
Typically,  three  mechanisms  are  used:  (a)  residual  determination  of  RDF 
deposits/withdrawals based on general fund year-end surpluses/deficits; (b) determination 
by  legislative  appropriations;  and  (c)  determination  through  a  mathematical  formula.
14 
More than one mechanism can be used at the same time.
15  
 
Residual  determination  of  deposits/withdrawals  and  determination  by  legislative 
appropriation make an RDF little different form the general fund and can be considered 
“weak rules”. Reference to a mathematical formula, on the contrary, reduces discretion and 
can be seen as a “strong rule”. In principle, only RDFs based on strong rules can ensure 
time consistency of policies and allow a State to be better equipped for the next downturn. 
Much as with the SGP, the issue lies with the credibility/enforceability of the provisions. 
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of RDFs on the fiscal behaviour of US States over 
the cycle is mixed. The majority of States appears to fail accumulating sufficient reserves 




Tests which do not differentiate between weak and strong rules tend to suggest that the 
introduction  of  RDFs  made  little  difference  in  fiscal  behaviour  (e.g.  Wagner,  2003). 
Highlighting differences in provisions accompanying RDFs, other studies have found that 
the fiscal performance of States with RDFs based on strong rules tends to be better than 
average (Sobel and Randall, 1996; Wagner and Elder, 2005; Wagner, 2004). 
 
Results from a panel analysis over 1984-97 by Knight and Levinson (1999) suggest that 
total balances are: (a) better in States with RDFs than in States without RDFs; and (b) 
better in States whose RDFs have strict deposit and withdrawal rules (and no maximum 
size) than in States whose RDFs are run on the basis of legislative discretion. However, 
Wagner (2003) subsequently showed that the analysis in Knight and Levinson (1999) did 
not take into account non-stationarity of variables and once this is properly treated, found 
no evidence that the presence of an RDF has an impact on total government balances. 
Nevertheless,  Wagner  (2003)  does  find  evidence  that  total  balances  are  better  when 
withdrawals from an RDF are regulated by supermajority rules.
17  
                                                 
13 In some States, RDFs balances cannot exceed a predetermined threshold.  
14 In a few cases deposits to the RDF are tied to specific revenue. This is the case of the oil taxes and of other 
mineral taxes in Alaska and Texas. Such cases are often not included in empirical analyses of US RDFs 
since they are regarded as exceptions. Indeed, funds tied to nonrenewable resources face very specific 
problems. Government revenue stemming from the exploitation of non-renewable resources differs from 
other revenue as it partly represents a depletion of assets. Secondly, using non-renewable resources raises 
important intergenerational issues (see Davis et al., 2003). 
15 For example, this is the case of Kentucky Budget Reserve Trust Fund, i.e. the Kentucky’s RDF, which can 
be replenished by the allocation of any end-of-year surplus as well as by direct appropriation. 
16  See, for instance, Sobel and Holcombe (1996), Levinson (1998) and Lav and Berube (1999). 
17  Moreover, Wagner (2004) also finds that States experience a reduction in bond yields after the introduction 
of an RDF and RDFs with different types of deposit and withdrawal rules affect borrowing costs differently 
(States with strict-rule RDFs obtain the largest reduction in yields). This suggests that the markets perceive 
RDFs as tools to enhance fiscal soundness by improving the States’ ability to manage a fiscal crisis.   9 
 
Another set of studies focuses on the behaviour of expenditure over the cycle and finds 
more evidence in support of a positive role of RDFs. Hou (2005) finds that own-source 
expenditures (i.e. those that are not financed by transfers from other government tiers) are 
least affected by adverse cyclical conditions in States with fiscal reserves in RDFs. Wagner 
and Elder (2005) find a significant reduction in the volatility of expenditure in those States 
with a strict-rule RDF.
18  
 
The difficulties in implementing “good” cyclical policies and the diversity of outcomes 
under similar fiscal rules are not an exclusive prerogative of the US. In Europe, the average 
sensitivity of government budgets to the output gap over the cycle appears to be lower than 
one would expect on the basis of automatic stabilizers alone and there is evidence that this 
reflects significant asymmetries across positive and negative cyclical phases. Specifically, 
discretionary policy tends to act procyclically in good times – thus offsetting the automatic 
stabilizers – and to be neutral in bad times.
19 In general, there is little evidence that the 
introduction of fiscal rules, either with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, or with the SGP in 
1997, has affected the cyclicality of fiscal policy.  
 
We estimated a simple fiscal reaction function for each of the original members of the euro 
area (excluding Luxemburg and Germany)
20 to assess the cyclical performance of fiscal 
policy in these countries.
21 
 
Results confirm a low average cyclical sensitivity of the budget and a certain degree of 
asymmetry. Moreover, they confirm significant differences across countries. The cyclical 
sensitivity of the budget is not statistically different from zero in Belgium, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands, suggesting that procyclical fiscal policy systematically offsets the effects 
of automatic  stabilizers. In Ireland, Portugal and Spain the cyclicality of the  budget  is 
found to be asymmetric: a countercyclical response to negative output gaps is accompanied 
by a procyclical or neutral response to positive output gaps. Only in Austria and Finland 
does the reaction of the budget appear to be consistently countercyclical across good and 
bad times (see Appendix 2 for details). 
 
In  France,  Portugal  and  Italy  the  unsatisfactory  cyclical  performance  of  the  budget  is 
accompanied  by  inadequate  progress  towards  achieving  the  objective  of  a  budgetary 
position close to balance or in surplus. On the other hand, in Austria and Finland not only 
did the budget react appropriately to cyclical conditions, but progress towards a close to 
balance position was steady.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Gonzales and Paqueo (2003) obtain similar findings and show that the reduction in volatility mainly affects 
social spending. 
 
19   See,  for instance, Buti, Franco and Ongena (1998), European Commission (2001), von Hagen (2002), 
Balassone and Francese (2004) and IMF (2004 and 2006). While most of the evidence comes from panel 
studies, Balassone (2005) analyzes cyclical asymmetry in fiscal policy in a single country study of Sweden. 
20 The  exclusion  of  Germany  reflects  technical  difficulties  related  to  the  structural  break  due  to  the 
reunification. Results on a dataset truncated in 1990 suggest that fiscal policy was cyclically well-behaved 
in pre-unification Germany. Estimation of the reaction function over the subsequent 1990-2004 period 
provides no statistically significant result.  
21  We plan to run a similar exercise on US states in a subsequent version of the paper.    10 
Fig. 5 – Heterogeneity of budgetary outcomes in the euro area: 
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Figure 5 shows the degree of heterogeneity of budgetary outcomes in the euro area over 
1995-2002.  In  1995 the  average  net  borrowing  of  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy  and 
Portugal (countries which were later to breach the 3 per cent deficit threshold) was much 
the same as that of the other euro-area countries, at about 5 per cent of GDP. In 2000, while 
the rest of the euro area scored a surplus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal 
recorded an average deficit of 1.6 per cent of GDP. The opening of the gap was largely due 
to differences  in policies.  All countries  improved their cyclically-adjusted balance until 
1999.  Thereafter,  while  the  other  countries  kept  progressing  towards  a  CTB  position, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece loosened their budgets by about 2 percentage 
points, to reach a cyclically adjusted deficit of about 4 per cent of GDP in 2001-02.  
 
 
4. Can RDF make a difference in Europe? 
 
The  US  experience  shows  that  RDFs  per  se  do  not  fundamentally  alter  the  incentive 
problems underlying procyclical policies. It also shows that rule-based RDFs can help to 
reconcile soundness and flexibility. But in this case, much as with the SGP and with fiscal 
rules in general, issues of commitment, credibility and enforceability arise. 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis in Section 2 suggests that there is one aspect in which RDFs 
could improve upon the current European framework. With RDFs the room for manoeuvre 
in bad times depends directly on surpluses accumulated in good times. In principle, this 
could allow more flexibility compared to the predetermined 3 per cent deficit ceiling of the 
Maastricht  Treaty  and  would  represent  a  further  move  towards  a  country-specific 
framework, away from the much criticized “one-size-fits-all” approach characterizing the 
original EU fiscal framework. 
 
This  Section  considers  if  and  how  European  countries  can  take  advantage  of  the 
opportunity offered by RDFs within the framework defined by the Maastricht Treaty and 
the  SGP.  The  following  issues  are  examined:  (a)  Should  RDFs  be  introduced  at  the 
European  or  at the  national  level?  (b)  How  should  the  EU  accounting  and  monitoring 
framework  be  modified  to  accommodate  RDFs?  (c)  What  restrictions  should  apply  to 
deposits and (d) withdrawals, in order to avoid the opportunistic exploitation of RDFs? (e) 
Which countries could actually benefit from the RDFs?  
 
RDFs: a national institution. – The reform of the SGP in 2005 aimed at increasing the 
flexibility of fiscal policy in EU countries. One-size-fits-all rules were not considered an   11 
optimal solution, in particular with respect to the preventive arm of the Pact. Indeed the 
European Council has been calling for improvements in national fiscal frameworks, as a 
complement to the SGP reform. 
 
In  this  environment the  introduction  of  a  new  centralized  and  rule-based  instrument  is 
unlikely to find much support. Moreover, there is no reason to maintain that all countries 
should pursue an increase in the room for manoeuvre in bad times compared to what is 
allowed under current provisions. Therefore, RDFs should more appropriately be national 
tools.  
 
Changes to the EU accounting/monitoring framework to accommodate RDFs. – As noted 
above,  under  ESA95  deposits  to  and  withdrawals  from  an  RDF  would  be  recorded  as 
changes in financial assets which do not affect the deficit level, but the composition of its 
financing.   
 
Without a change in the definition of the “Maastricht deficit”, which is based on ESA 
accounting rules, national authorities would have little incentive to introduce RDFs. With 
respect to EMU fiscal rules, the only benefit of accumulating assets in good times would be 
the possibility to avoid increasing gross debt in bad times as RDFs balances could be used 
to  finance  the  deficit  instead.  However, there  would  be  no  change  with  respect to the 
maximum allowed deficit (the 3 per cent ceiling). 
 
A revised interpretation of ESA accounting rules could allow withdrawals from an RDF in 
bad times to be considered as additional revenue and thus reduce the deficit. This change 
may entail a revision of the EDP Protocol of the Treaty (European Commission, 2006).
22 
 
A number of monitoring/regulatory issues would arise. To minimize monitoring costs and 
hazards, there should be only one RDF per member state. Detailed reporting concerning 
level, changes and investment out of RDFs balances should be provided. In particular, this 
reporting could be included in the bi-annual Notifications of fiscal data which member 
states currently provide to European authorities. To ensure that RDF balances represent 
genuine  savings  and  that  they  are  readily  available  in  bad  times,  they  should  only  be 
invested in liquid, low-risk assets. For instance, financial assets which may be problematic 
to  dispose  of,  such  as  shares  of  publicly  owned  companies  not  included  in  general 
government, should not qualify for RDF investment. Eligibility for the exemption could be 
granted only to bonds with a certain minimal rating, possibly those which can be used as 
collateral for monetary policy operations, and to other low risk financial assets. Adequate 
governance provisions and a transparent investment strategy should be set in place before a 
fund qualifies as an RDF under the EU fiscal framework.  
 
Restrictions on deposits: no debt financing. – As shown in Section 2, if bond-financed 
deposits into the RDF are allowed, gross debt will rise as new bonds are issued and remain 
constant when resources are drawn from the RDF. This pattern can repeat over time with 
gross and net financial liabilities gradually expanding. To avoid this ratchet effect on debt 
dynamics, RDFs should be exclusively financed out of surpluses. 
 
                                                 
22 Sapir et al. (2003) suggest that this change is worthwhile only if a critical number of governments are ready 
to introduce the RDFs. However, this consideration may unnecessarily restrict the minority of countries 
willing to create RDFs or in need of the extra flexibility that they may provide. Furthermore, once the 
provision is in place, other countries may be induced to follow.   12 
Therefore, RDFs are not an option for countries with relatively high deficits. However, 
countries running a  cyclically-adjusted deficit of 1 per cent of GDP (the  medium-term 
objective indicated in the revised SGP for low debt/high potential growth countries) would 
be in a position to transfer resources to their RDF in good times (fig. 6). 
 
Restrictions on withdrawals. – The conditions under which withdrawals from the RDFs are 
to be considered as  budget revenue  have to be decided ex ante. Member states should 
evidently not be allowed to use RDF balances for running a high deficit in good times. 
Restricting the use of RDF balances to significant downturns would prevent RDFs from 
contributing to unnecessary expansionary procyclical policies. However, if RDFs are to 
allow extra margins with respect to current provisions, such conditions should obviously be 
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Fig. 6 - RDF and cyclically adjusted deficits
 
 
In this respect, the recent reform of the SGP has somewhat reduced the added value that 
RDFs could offer in the European framework. The original SGP only allowed deficits in 
excess of 3 per cent under negative GDP growth rates of at least -2.0 per cent (-0.75 per 
cent  in  case  of  an  abrupt  slowdown  or  an  accumulated  loss  of  output  relative  to  past 
trends).  The new SGP allows deficits larger than 3 per cent whenever the rate of growth of 
GDP is negative (or there is an accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of 
very  low  annual  GDP  growth  relative  to  potential).  Nevertheless,  there  could  still  be 
situations  which  fall  outside  the  new  provisions  and  yet  require  additional  budgetary 
flexibility (e.g. a short period of very low growth). Moreover, the SGP reform did not alter 
the requirement that the deficit should stay close to 3 per cent. 
 
The  introduction  of  additional  numerical  rules  as  means  to  regulate  withdrawals  from 
RDFs would be problematic. First, one should keep in mind the problems concerning the 
assessment of good and bad times  in practice.  Second, additional  numerical provisions 
would counter the objective of increasing flexibility at the national level. The solution can 
be  found  in  the  ‘double-key’  procedural  approach  suggested  by  Sapir  et  al.  (2003), 
according to which the decision to draw on the fund should require the approval of both the 
Member State and the Council (the latter based on a recommendation by the Commission). 
This procedure could also discipline the size of withdrawals. Basically, the Council should 
veto a gross misuse of RDF balances with negative externalities on the area. 
Which countries would have benefited from RDFs? – Overall, the fifteen countries which 
were EU members in 1992 – the year of the Treaty of Maastricht – recorded 50 surpluses 
and 115 deficits over the period 1995-2005 (Table 1). The surpluses were recorded by nine   13 
countries:  Belgium,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Finland,  Denmark,  Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. If these countries had accumulated those surpluses in an RDF, they 
would  now  hold  reserves  ranging  between  Belgium’s  0.5  per  cent  of  GDP  and 
Luxembourg’s 28.5 per cent. Finland would have reserves close to those of Luxembourg 
(26.8 per cent of GDP). Ireland, Denmark and Sweden would have RDF’s with balances 
well above 10 per cent of GDP. The Netherlands and the UK would hold balances of 1.7 
and 3.6 per cent of GDP, respectively. The potential benefits from an RDF are larger for 
volatile economies, where the 3 per cent threshold is more likely to be binding in bad times 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 1 - UE15 countries net borrowing over the period 1995-2005
(1) 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Italy 7.4 7.0 2.7 2.8 1.7 2.0 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.4 4.1
France 5.5 4.1 3.0 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.6 3.2 4.2 3.7 2.9
Germany 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.5 1.1 2.8 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.2
UK 5.7 4.1 2.1 -0.1 -1.1 -1.6 -0.9 1.7 3.3 3.2 3.3
Spain 6.5 4.8 3.3 3.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 -1.1
Belgium 4.4 3.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3
Denmark 2.0 1.1 -0.4 -1.0 -2.2 -3.2 -2.2 -1.2 -1.1 -2.7 -4.9
Greece 10.2 7.4 6.6 4.3 3.4 4.0 5.4 5.2 6.1 7.8 5.2
Ireland 2.0 0.0 -1.3 -2.4 -2.7 -4.6 -0.8 0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -1.1
Luxembourg -2.4 -1.2 -3.7 -3.4 -3.4 -6.0 -6.1 -2.1 -0.3 1.1 1.0
Netherlands 4.3 1.9 1.2 0.9 -0.4 -1.3 0.2 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.3
Portugal 5.2 4.5 3.4 3.0 2.7 3.2 4.3 2.9 2.9 3.2 6.0
Austria 5.6 3.9 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.9 0.0 0.5 1.6 1.2 1.5
Finland 6.2 3.5 1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -6.9 -5.0 -4.1 -2.5 -2.3 -2.7
Sweden 7.0 2.7 0.9 -1.8 -2.5 -5.0 -2.6 0.2 -0.1 -1.8 -3.0
 
(1) A minus sign indicates a surplus. Data do not include UMTS proceeds. 
 
 
Table 2 - Cumulated surpluses, average gross debt 












Italy 0.0 111.5 2.4
France 0.0 59.3 1.8
Germany (3) 0.0 61.0  2.2 - 1.1
UK 3.6 43.7 1.8
Spain 1.1 56.8 2.7
Belgium 0.5 110.2 2.0
Denmark 18.8 54.0 2.3
Greece 0.0 110.7 4.2
Ireland 14.6 46.7 2.9
Luxembourg 28.5 6.9 3.3
Netherlands 1.7 59.8 1.9
Portugal 0.0 56.3 3.2
Austria 0.0 65.4 1.9
Finland 26.8 47.1 2.9
Sweden 14.9 59.7 2.0
 
 
(1) As a percentage of GDP. – (2) Standard deviation. – 
(3) The first data for real GDP volatility refers to the 
pre-unification  period;  the  second  data  for  real  GDP 
volatility refers to the post-unification period. 
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This evidence shows that RDFs could already have a significant number of users. If most 
countries were to reach their medium-term objectives (which should not exceed a 1 per 
cent of GDP deficit) the number of potential users of RDFs would be even larger. The size 






RDFs are not a magic wand. They do not tackle at the root the incentive problem that 
governments have in good times. They are of no use for countries which are permanently in 
a  deficit  position.  However,  they  can  improve  the  room  for  manoeuvre  for  virtuous 
countries.  
 
To  seize  the  benefits  of  RDFs  in  the  European  context,  the  definition  of  “Maastricht 
deficit” should be appropriately modified. Accompanying provisions should be carefully 
devised to avoid that RDFs become a means to circumvent fiscal rules. A crucial issue is 
the restrictions on deposits: only surpluses should be acceptable. 
 
The  extra  flexibility  provided  by  RDFs  would  allow  a  tighter  implementation  of  the 
procedure for countries exceeding the 3 per cent limit.  
 
RDFs would only be a viable instrument for countries which are close to the medium-term 
target of close to balance. The benefits of RDFs would be higher, the higher the volatility 
of GDP. 
 
The  paper  has  not  discussed  the  possibility  of  using  RDFs  at  the  subnational  level 
(Balassone  et  al.,  2004).  Given  the  current  definition  of  “Maastricht  deficit”,  the 
availability  of  liquid  balances  in  subnational  RDFs  could  complicate  compliance  with 
European fiscal rules: an unexpected withdrawal from RDFs by subnational governments 
could push the general government deficit above the 3 per cent threshold. This may explain 
why RDFs are not that popular in Europe. The issue could be reopened by the change in the 
definition of Maastricht deficit needed for the viability of national RDFs, since it would be 
difficult to apply different rules to subnational RDFs.  
 
The development of local RDFs could contribute to limiting procyclical policies and help 
subnational governments to respect national  budgetary rules (such as domestic stability 
pacts).  Nevertheless,  there  would  be  problematic  implications.  The  existence  of  many 
RDFs within a single country would burden monitoring at the EU level. Since a general 
government  deficit  is  consistent  with  surpluses  among  subnational  governments,  the 
possibility arises that the principle according to which RDFs should only be financed out of 
general government surpluses is violated. Moreover, the regulation of withdrawals would 
become more difficult as several cycles would become relevant, not just the national one. 
 
Moreover, the paper has not dealt with the details of how RDFs could work in practice in 
EU countries and with several possible lessons which can be learnt from the US experience 
(e.g. with reference to the portfolio composition and the rates of return on assets held in 
RDFs and to ways of monitoring RDFs so as to avoid any opportunistic use). 
 
These considerations point to the  need  for  further work concerning the  introduction of 
RDFs and the related changes in the EU fiscal framework.    15 
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APPENDIX 1 – US States’ stabilization funds: main features
(1)  
 
US State  Name of the fund  Deposit Method  Withdrawal 
Method 
Limit
(2)  First year in 
place 
First year with a 
positive balance 
Alaska  Constitutional Budget 
Reserve Fund 




No limit  1990  1992 
Arizona  Budget Stabilization Fund  Formula  Formula  5 per cent  1991  1994 
California  Special Fund for 
Economic Uncertainties 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1976  1977 
Connecticut  Budget Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1979  1981 
Delaware  Budget Reserve Account  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1977  1979 
Florida  Budget Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  20 per cent  1959  1965 
Georgia  Revenue Shortfall 
Reserve 
Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
No limit  1976  1976 
Hawaii  Emergency and Budget 





No limit  2000  - 




No limit  1984  1984 
Illinois  -  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  2000  - 
Indiana  Countercyclical Revenue 
and Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
Formula  Formula  7 per cent  1982  1985 






5 per cent  1992  1993 
Kentucky  Budget Reserve Trust 
Fund Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1983  1987 
Louisiana  Revenue Stabilization and 
Mineral Trust Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1966  1967 
Maine  Maine Rainy Day Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  1985  1985 
Maryland  Revenue Stabilization 
Fund 
Formula  Legislative 
appropriation 
No limit  1985  1987 
Massachusetts  Commonwealth 
Stabilization Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1985  1987 
Michigan  Countercyclical Budget 
and Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
Formula  Formula  25 per cent  1977  1978 
Minnesota  Budget Reserve Account  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1984  1996 
Mississippi  Working Cash-
Stabilization reserve Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  7.5 per cent  1982  1983 
Missouri  Budget Stabilization Fund  Legislative 
appropriation 
Budget deficit  5 per cent  1992  1992 
Nebraska  Cash Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1983  1984   18 
Nevada  Fund to Stabilize the 
Operation of the State 
Government 
Formula   Budget deficit  8 per cent  1991  1994 
New Hampshire  Revenue Stabilization 
Reserve Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1987  1987 
New Jersey  Surplus Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1990  1993 
New York  Tax Stabilization Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  2 per cent  1946  1946 
North Carolina  Savings Reserve Account  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
5 per cent  1991  1991 
North Dakota  Budget Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Formula  No limit  1987  1990 
Ohio  Budget Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  1981  1981 
Oklahoma  Constitutional Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  10 per cent  1985  1988 
Pennsylvania  Tax Stabilization Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  3 per cent  1985  1986 
Rhode Island  Budget Reserve and Cash 
Stabilization Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  3 per cent  1985  1985 
South Carolina  General Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1978  1978 
South Dakota  Budget Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1991  1992 
Tennessee  Reserves for Revenue 
Fluctuations 
Formula  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1972  1972 
Texas  Economic Stabilization 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  10 per cent  1988  1990 
Utah  Budget Reserve Account  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  8 per cent  1986  1987 
Vermont  General Fund Budget 
Stabilization Reserve 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1987  1988 
Virginia  Revenue Stabilization 
Fund 
Formula  Formula  10 per cent  1992  1993 
Washington  Emergency Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
5 per cent  1981  1989 
West Virginia  Revenue Shortfall 
Reserve Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1994  1995 
Wyoming  Budget Reserve Account  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
No limit  1982  1983 
Sources: Hou (2005), Eckl (1995); Wagner and Elder (2005); Kentucky State Budget Director (2001); Zahradnick (2005).  
(1) States without an RDF (according to any of the two definitions reported in Sections 2) are not reported in this table. 
More specifically, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Oregon do not have an RDF. In particular, Alabama 
introduced a fund similar to a budget stabilization fund in 1988 (Education Trust Fund Proration Account). Nevertheless, 
this fund is only supposed to be used to supplement educational expenditure and therefore this is not a rainy day fund 
according to our definitions. Note that the National Conference of State legislatures and the National Association of State 
Budget  Officers  do  consider  this  fund  an  RDF.  Moreover,  since  1982  Colorado  has  a  fund  (required  Fund  Balance). 
Nevertheless,  it  is  a  non-accumulating  Fund  and  therefore  it  is  not  an  RDF.  –  (2)  As  a  percentage  of  general  fund 
expenditure. 
   19 
APPENDIX 2 – The cyclicality of fiscal policy in the euro area 
 
 
We specify the fiscal authorities’ reaction function in a way which is rather standard in the 
literature. The budget balance is regressed against its lagged value, the level of public debt 
and a measure of the cyclical conditions (see, for instance, Bohn, 1998; Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2002; and Galì and Perotti, 2003). Concerning the latter, we take into 
account separately good and bad times as measured by positive and negative output gaps 
(see, for instance, Balassone and Francese, 2004). The estimating equation therefore is: 
 




t   + et 
 
where d is the budget deficit as a share of GDP, b is the debt-to-GDP ratio and w
p and w
n
   
indicate,  respectively,  positive  and  negative  output  gaps.  We  also  introduce  dummy 
variables to test for structural breaks. Specifically, we consider 1993, the year after the 
Treaty of Maastricht, and 1998, the first year of the euro area and the year following the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact, as possible breaks for European countries.  
 
The results are reported in the following table. The panel regression highlights how the 
average  cyclical  sensitivity  of  the  budget  is  lower  than  one  would  expect  from  the 
operation  of  automatic  stabilizers  alone.
23  Moreover,  there  is  a  large  (though  not 
statistically significant) difference between the coefficient for positive output gaps (-0.03) 
and the coefficient for negative output gaps (-0.34) confirming some asymmetry in the 
conduct of fiscal policy between good and bad times.  
 
Concerning single country equations, we tested for cyclical asymmetry in fiscal policy by 
controlling the statistical significance of differences between coefficients for positive and 
negative  output  gaps  (where  the  difference  was  not  significant  we  estimate  a  single 
coefficient). As a rule, we only kept an explanatory variable in the regression when its 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
 
Results confirm that for most countries, the cyclical performance of fiscal policy is not 
satisfactory. The cyclical sensitivity of the budget is not statistically different from zero in 
Belgium,  France,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands,  suggesting  that  procyclical  fiscal  policy 
systematically offsets the effects of automatic stabilizers.
24 In Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
the cyclicality of the budget is asymmetric: a countercyclical response to negative output 
gaps is accompanied by a procyclical or neutral response to positive output gaps. Only in 
Austria and Finland is the reaction of the budget consistently countercyclical across good 






                                                 
23  The  average  automatic  semi-elasticity  of  the  budget  to  the  output  gap  is  estimated  at  0.5  (see,  e.g., 
Bouthevillain et al., 2001).  
24 Italy is a borderline case: the point estimates of the coefficients for positive and negative output gaps have 
opposite signs (+1.0 and -0.5, respectively) are both significantly different from zero (though only at the 10 
and 5 per cent significance level, respectively). However, their difference falls just short of significance at 
the 10 per cent level.    20 
 
panel BE FRA ITA NL IRL PT SPA AU FIN
Constant 1.58*** 2.08** 0.98** 6.60*** 1.39** 6.96** 8.39*** -0.06 1.75*** 0.79*
(4.28) (2.60) (2.13) (3.92) (2.69) (2.17) (5.20) (0.17) (2.92) (1.75)
dt-1 0.82*** 0.77*** 0.70*** 0.84*** 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.17  0.79*** 0.43** 0.66***
(19.46) (8.55) (4.69) (12.09) (4.61) (3.80) (1.19) (9.58) (2.48) (6.38)
bt-1 -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.09***
(2.66) (4.11) (2.23) (3.75)
w
p
t -0.04 0.17 0.49** 0.25
(0.31) (0.57) (2.24) (1.42)
w
n
t -0.34*** -1.13** -0.81*** -0.63**
(2.95) (2.32) (3.77) (2.62)
wt -0.16 -0.04 0.28 -0.28 -0.29* -0.48***
(0.65) (0.24) (1.24) (1.48) (1.98) (3.38)
d93 -0.48* -0.22*** -0.91* -5.07**
(1.83) (2.80) (1.83) (2.25)
d98 -1.43* -1.01*
(1.90) (1.92)
Adj. R2 0.85 0.86 0.57 0.92 0.64 0.88 0.69 0.84 0.54 0.75
obs. 249 34 25 24 35 19 27 34 28 29
Method of estimation: OLS (fixed effects, heteroskedasticity robust SE for the panel regression). T-statistics in brackets. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Period of analysis varies across countries (maximum span is 1970-2004).
The cyclicality of fiscal policy in the euro area   
(dependent variable: dt)
 
 
 
 